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absent a compelling state interest. With the Court at the crossroads in its
application of the right, it must fervantly be hoped that a right to be let alone
will become more than a legal fiction, for its existence is incompatible with
a brave new world.
HARLEY RIEDEL

PARENTAL IMMUNITY: THE CASE FOR ABROGATION OF
PARENTAL IMMUNITY IN FLORIDA
Based upon a public policy that sought to preserve the family relationship,
parental immunity has enjoyed universal acceptance in American courts.' This
doctrine, which denies a minor child 2 the right to sue his parent3 in tort for
4
injuries caused by the parent, has found little favor among legal scholars.
Within the last decade a judicial trend towards abrogation of the rule has
arisen because the doctrine is illogical in the context of modern society. 5
Florida is among the jurisdictions in which parental immunity remains applicable; therefore, the logic supporting the doctrine and the challenges raised
against it should be evaluated to determine its continuing validity.
1. See Comment, Tort Actions Between Members of the Family-Husband & IVifeParent & Child, 26 Mo. L. REv. 152, 183 n.168 (1961).
2. Although the term "minor child" is often used in relation to the parental immunity
doctrine, the concept technically applies to "unemancipated" children. Emancipation in
Florida takes place when the child reaches twenty-one years of age. Riley v. Holmer, 100
Fla. 938, 939, 131 So. 330, 331 (1930); Beckman v. Beckman, 53 Fla. 858, 862, 43 So. 923, 924
(1907). However, judges of the circuit court have power to emancipate a child over eighteen
pursuant to the filing of a petition by the child's guardian. FLA. STAT. §62.011 (1971).
3. While this immunity is referred to as "parental immunity," it must be noted that the
doctrine is reciprocal. Actions by parents against their children are barred as well as actions
by children against their parents. It is a "parent-child immunity" in reality. See, e.g., Meehan
v. Meehan, 133 So. 2d 776 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
4. See Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 253, 163 A.2d 147, 151 (1960) (dissenting opinion citing a lengthy list of scholarly works opposed to parental immunity); IV. PROsSER, Ti
LAW OF TORTS 879 (4th ed. 1971).
5. See Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alas. 1967); Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471 P.2d
282 (1970); Gibson %. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971); Schenk
v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 241 N.E.2d 12 (1968); Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921
(Ky. Ct. App. 1970); Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968); Briere v.
Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); France v. A.P.A. Transport Corp., 56 N.J. 500,
267 A.2d 490 (1970); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529
(1969); Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1967); Goller v. White, 20 Vis. 2d 402, 122
N.W.2d 193 (1963).
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PARENTAL IMMUNITY
ORUGIN OF THE DOGnNE

The doctrine of parental immunity was not recognized at common law.6
This exclusively American rule of law was created in 1891 in Hewellette v.
George7 when the Supreme Court of Mississippi "laid the egg from which
parental immunity was hatched."s Hewellette involved a false imprisonment
action brought by a minor daughter against her mother who had maliciously
committed the child to an insane asylum. Citing no authority, the court reversed judgment for the child rationalizing that: 9
The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a sound
public policy, designed to subserve the repose of families and the best
interests of society, forbid to the minor child a right to appear in court
in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries suffered
at the hands of the parent.
This immunity doctrine soon became entrenched in American law by two
decisions that relied upon the Mississippi case. In McKelvey v. McKelveyO a
minor was denied the right to sue her father and stepmother for cruel and
inhuman treatment, while in Roller v. Roller" the court concluded that society's interest in preserving harmony in domestic relations barred a minor's
suit against her father - even though he had raped her.
With a foundation built upon such extreme cases, parental immunity was
sufficiently persuasive to be adopted by every jurisdiction subsequently considering the doctrine.' 2 Fortunately, however, the original doctrine has been
eroded by many exceptions developed to prevent the injustice that strict application of the rule would produce.' 3 Actions have been allowed by children
against their parents where the child is emancipated,14 where the child has
attained majority, 5 where the parent-child relationship has been terminated
by the death of either, 6 where the suit is for wrongful death of the child's
other parent, 7 where the injury resulted from the parent's business,18 where
persons standing in loco parentis were sued, 9 where the child's injury was the

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

See W. PRossER, Tim LAw OF To Ts 886 (4th ed. 1971).
68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). This case is also cited to as Hewlett v. George.
Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 916, 479 P.2d 648, 649, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 289 (1971).
Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 711, 9 So. 885, 887 (1891).
111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).

11.

37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).

12.

See Comment, supra note 1.

13. Speaking of the erosion of the doctrine one court has stated: "(L]ike the all-day
sucker in the hands of a small child . . . there isn't much left but the stick itself." Schenk
v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 204, 241 N.E.2d 12, 14 (1968).
14. See, e.g., Wood v. Wood, 135 Conn. 280, 63 A.2d 586 (1948).
15. E.g., Farrar v. Farrar, 41 Ga. App. 120, 152 S.E. 278 (1930).
16. E.g., Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314, 211 A.2d 410 (1965).
17. E.g., Henderson v. Henderson, 14 Fla. Supp. 181 (Ct. Rec., Escambia County 1958).
18. E.g., Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952).
19. E.g., Wilkens v. Kane, 74 N.J. Super. 414, 181 A.2d 417 (1962).
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result of an intentional or wilful act by the parents, 20 where there was abusive
parental discipline, 21 and where the parent was guilty of gross negligence.22
Jurisdictions that still recognize parental immunity have not applied these exceptions uniformly, and each jurisdiction must be examined to determine the
extent to which it applies the doctrine.
PARENTAL IMMUNITY IN FLORIDA

Parental immunity was not at issue in any reported Florida case until
1958.23 In the case of first impression, Henderson v. Henderson,24 a four-yearold minor sued his father for the wrongful death of his mother. The court did
not consider the possibility of totally rejecting the parental immunity doctrine
but merely noted that the rule was founded in Mississippi and followed by
other jurisdictions.2 5 Thus, with this "good enough for them- good enough
for us" attitude, parental immunity was integrated into Florida law.
Despite this tacit assent regarding the general parental immunity doctrine,
the Henderson court wisely adopted a partial immunity approach much nar2
r This
rower in application than that originally propounded in Hewellette..
partial immunity was limited to acts committed by parents in the exercise of
lawful parental control over their children. Torts committed beyond the exercise of lawful parental control or in exercise of parental control but in a
malicious or wanton manner were not considered immune.27 Consequently, in
Henderson the minor was allowed to bring an action against his father for
killing his mother, an act not committed within the exercise of lawful parental
control.
Hence, both intentional and negligent tortfeasors were denied parental
immunity if their tortious acts were not committed while exercising lawful
parental control. Although this limitation made it unlikely that extreme decisions involving intentional torts such as those in Hewellette28 McKelvey,

9

°

and Roller" would be rendered in Florida courts, it also established that negligent torts committed in the exercise of lawful parental control were within the
scope of the immunity. This premise was established in Meehan v. Meehan-'

20. E.g., Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950).
21. E.g., Buttram v. Buttram, 98 Ga. App. 226, 105 S.E.2d 510 (1958).
22. E.g., Buttram v. Buttram, 98 Ga. App. 226, 105 S.E.2d 510 (1958).
23. An earlier Florida case, Shiver v. Sessions, 80 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1955), dealt with facts
that may have involved a question of parental immunity. In Shiver minor children were
allowed to sue the estate of their stepfather who had killed their mother and then himself.
Whether the court considered parental immunity is unknown, since no mention of the
doctrine appears in the opinion.
24. 14 Fla. Supp. 181 (Ct. Rec., Escambia County 1958).
25. Id. at 183.
26. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
27. Henderson v. Henderson, 14 Fla. Supp. 181, 183 (Ct. Rec., Escambia County 1958).
28. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891) (child maliciously committed to insane asylum).
29. 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903) (cruel and inhuman treatment).
30. 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905) (rape of child).
31. 133 So. 2d 776 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
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when a father brought an action against his son for negligently failing to disclose the danger of an electric buffer to another son who was consequently
electrocuted. Applying the doctrine in its reciprocal form, the court barred the
father from bringing an action against his son because of a public policy aimed
at encouraging family unity and maintaining family discipline.
Subsequent Florida cases relied on the Meehan precedent in denying
children the right to bring negligence actions against their parents in a variety
of situations. One minor was barred from bringing an action against his parents
after being severely burned while playing with charcoal lighter fluid and
matches that the parents had negligently left in his play area.3 2 Other minors
were denied the right to sue their parents when they were injured in automobile"" and airplanes- accidents caused by their parents' negligence.
This tacit acceptance of parental immunity in negligence actions culminated with its acceptance by the Supreme Court of Florida.A5 Addressing
itself to the issue for the first time, the court was satisfied merely to say that
many decisions supported the proposition that children could not sue their
parents. 6 Although the unchallenged acceptance of parental immunity in
negligence actions appeared even more likely to continue as a result of this
supreme court dicta, the doctrine was finally questioned in 1972 by the dissent in Vinci v. Gensler.7
In Vinci an action was brought by the personal representative of two
deceased children against their father's estate for his negligent operation of
an aircraft, which resulted in the death of the entire family. Although the
majority opinion maintained the acquiescent acceptance of parental immunity
by affirming per curiam a trial court decision denying the minors' personal
representative the right to sue, the dissent refused to accept the logic of the
doctrine. After examining the doctrine, the dissent asserted that the logic
supporting parental immunity, although possibly persuasive in the past, is not
applicable in modern society. Parental immunity was said to be an "ill-founded
doctrine.., supported by mistaken axioms and ill-founded reasons.". 8 The
Vinci dissent indicates that it is time to determine whether the doctrine has
outlived its usefulness.
THE CASE FOR ABROGATiON

Within the last decade, eleven jurisdictions have abrogated the doctrine of
parental immunity to varying degrees. 39 These jurisdictions have examined

32. Rickard v. Rickard, 203 So. 2d 776 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
33. E.g., Webb v. Allstate Ins. Co., 258 So. 2d 840 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1972); Denault v.
Denault, 220 So. 2d 27 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
34. E.g., Vinci v. Gensler, 269 So. 2d 20 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
35. Orefice v. Albert, 237 So. 2d 142, 145 (Fla. 1970).

36. Apparently the court meant lower court decisions in Florida,
37. 269 So. 2d 20, 22 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1972),

38. Id.
39. See note 5 supra.
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the three traditional arguments 40 proffered in support of the immunity and
have found them to be too weak to justify its continued application. The
three traditional arguments are: 41 (1) that family harmony would be disrupted by allowing children to sue their parents, (2) that there is a danger of
fraud or collusion between family adversaries where the defendant has liability insurance, and (3) that parental authority and discipline would be
threatened by allowing children to bring actions against their parents. These
arguments and the rebuttal to them serve as a basis for determining whether
Florida should abandon the parental immunity doctrine adopted in 1958.
Disruptionof Family Harmony
"Disruption of family harmony" was the original logic offered in support
of parental immunity in Hewellette v. George.42 Although this argument may
have seemed logical in the era in which it was first propounded, it was inconsistent with the right of a child to sue his parent in matters affecting property.43 Further, the risk of family discord is arguably much less in negligence
actions, where a judgment for the child will normally be paid by the father's
insurance carrier, than in property actions where a judgment ordinarily will
be satisfied from the father's assets.4 4 This rationale is based upon the observation that, although parent-child actions are almost uniformly denied because
of the disharmony that would be caused by the depletion of the family assets,
virtually no such suits are brought except where there is insurance. Where
4
there is insurance, no threat to family harmony exists. 5
Opponents of abrogation reply to the insurance argument with the traditional maxim that liability insurance does not create liability but only recompenses it where it exists.46 Nevertheless, those courts that have abrogated
parental immunity have relied heavily upon the availability of liability insurance. 47 Dean Prosser, a proponent of this approach, notes that in situations
in which there is insurance domestic harmony would certainly be disrupted
more by denying a child's action than by allowing it.48 Additionally, Prosser
points out that courts should not be concerned about defendants' lack of
liability insurance, since decisions imposing liability would certainly lead to
49
its purchase.
40. Other arguments have been advanced, but they overlap or are included within these
three. See McCurdy, Torts Between Parent and Child, 5 VILL. L. REv. 521, 529 (1960).
41. See Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 919, 479 P.2d 648, 651, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 291

(1971).
42. 68 Miss. 703, 711, 9 So. 885, 887 (1891).
43. See W. PRossER, THE LAW OF TORTS 885 (4th ed. 1971).
44. Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 919, 479 P.2d 648, 651, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 291 (1971).
45.

James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE

L.J. 549, 553 (1948).
46. W. PROssER, THr LAW OF TORTs 554, 868 (4th ed. 1971).
47. See, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 922, 479 P.2d 648, 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288,
293 (1971); Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 412, 122 N.W.2d 193, 197 (1963).
48. Mr . PROSSER, THE LAW OF ToRTs 868 (4th ed. 1971).
49. Id.
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Even those who have been persuaded that parental immunity should be
abrogated have expressed concern that abrogation might trigger a flood of
litigation. The repeal of Florida's guest statutes0 would seem to contribute to
this increase as by far the largest category of parent-child actions arise out of
automobile accidents. However, Florida's new "no-fault" automobile insurance5 l eliminates the need for litigation in the vast majority of cases. 52 This
compulsory insurance law requires automobile owners to purchase policies
that provide medical, surgical, funeral, and disability benefits covering their
children. 53 Thus, no-fault insurance has substantially reduced any justification
that may have existed for parental immunity in Florida by forcing parents to
insure against their childrens' injuries in the most likely area of parent-child
litigation.
Fraud or Collusion in Cases Involving Insurance
The "danger of fraud or collusion between family adversaries" argument,
which arises in cases involving liability insurance, is that: 54
The decision for the child to sue will be determined within the
family circle and obviously the proposed defendant is going to participate in making it, quite an unorthodox situation under our basic
concept of adversary litigation, to say the least. The risk of collusion
is indeed a very great and human one, when the insured's own flesh and
blood and the family pocketbook are concerned. It is unlikely in most
instances that the insurance carrier, whose interests are the only ones
really at stake, can adequately defend itself.
This argument appears to be inconsistent with the family harmony argument discussed previously. The collusion argument assumes that the minor's
suit is in reality aimed at the insurance carrier and not at his parent. 5 If that
is the case, where is the danger of disrupting the tranquility of the home?
Despite this internal inconsistency in the pro-immunity arguments, no
court has denied the latter argument. The courts readily concede that some
danger of collusion will always be present when the defendant in parent-child
actions has liability insurance. This same danger, however, is no greater when
a minor sues his parent than it is in actions between adult children and par50. Florida Laws

1972, ch.72-1, §1, repealingFla. Stat. §320.59 (1971).
51. Required by the Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act, FLA. STAT. §§627.730.741 (1971), which has been effective since Jan. 1, 1972.
52. The Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act, FLA. STAT. §§627.730-.741 (1971),
requires automobile owners to have personal injury protection coverage ("first party" insurance) that provides benefits for their children up to a $5,000 limit. The benefits may be
procured up to the limit for medical or disability claims or for a combination of both up
to the $5,000 limit. FLA. STAT. §627.736 (1971).
53. FLA. STAT. §627.736 (1971) requires the insurance to cover, inter alia, "relatives residing in the same household," and in the case of a child not living with his parent coverage
would be provided by the catch-all phrase, which extends coverage to all "passengers in such
motor vehicle."
54. Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 252, 163 A.2d 147, 150 (1960).
55. Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 920, 479 P.2d 648, 652, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 292 (1971).
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ents, brothers and sisters, or husbands and wives, all of which have been permitted in jurisdictions that grant parental immunity in parent-child actions26
No-fault insurance diminishes the logic of the fraud or collusion argument
in automobile negligence situations.5 7 In addition, insurance carriers have the
ability to combat collusive suits by including contract conditions in their
policies that require the assistance and cooperation of the insured before the
insurer will be liable. 58 Under such conditions the insurer can require disclosure of all pertinent facts known or available to the insured and can require
the assistance of the insured in the conduct of all aspects of a suit. 59 If the
insurer was subjected to a fraudulently collusive suit it could deny liability
and refuse to pay any attorney fees or judgments incurred by the insured.6°
Were parental immunity to be abrogated, the use of contract conditions by
insurers would be a means of providing the proper adversary atmosphere to
parent-child actions and would rebut the argument that insurers cannot defend
themselves in such cases.
A final rebuttal to the fraud or collusion contention is based upon a
common sense analysis of our judicial system. Judges deal with credibility
problems daily and consequently have the ability to detect collusion and
fraud.6 1 Instructions by the court on the credibility of witnesses would surely
minimize fraud as a factor in parent-child litigations.62 Furthermore, lawyers
should not need to be reminded that they are officers of the court and practice
pursuant to an oath that prohibits the bringing of fraudulent actions and a
canon of ethics that bars taking part in collusive suits.

63

The Threat to ParentalAuthority and Discipline
The logic behind the "threat to parental authority and discipline" argument is that:

64

56. Id. at 919, 479 P.2d at 651, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 291. In Florida, however, it must be
noted that actions in tort between husband and wife are not permitted. See Note, Interspousal
Immunity in Tort: Its Relevance, Constitutionality, and Role in Conflict of Laws, 21 U. FLA.

L. Rav. 484, 487-88 (1969).
57. See text accompany note 51 supra.
58. For examples of such provisions see R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW- BAsIC TEXT 655
(1971); W. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INSURANCE 702 (1971).
59. R. KEETON, supra note 58; W. YOUNG, supra note 58.
60. There is no contract between the insurer and the insured until the conditions of
the policy have been met. However, it has been held that the actions of a parent in obtaining an attorney for his minor child to bring suit against the parent is not enough to constitute collusion. E.g., Jordan v. Standard Mut. Ins. Co., 50 I1. App. 2d 12, 199 N.E.2d 423
(1964). For a discussion of the requirements of the insured to assist and cooperate with the
insurer, see R. KEETON, supra note 58, at 458.
61. Vinci v. Gensler, 269 So. 2d 20, 21 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
62. Additionally, it has been said that in jury trials "jurors do not check their common
sense at the courthouse door." Id. at 22.
63. Id.
64. Mesite v. Kirchenstein, 109 Conn, 77, 84, 145 A. 753, 755 (1929).
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Authority in the parent to require obedience in the child is indispensible to the maintenance of unity in the family .... Few things
could bring about [a breakdown of authority and family unity] . ..
more quickly or widen the breach between parent and child further
than the bringing of an action at law for personal injuries by a minor
child against his parent.
The validity of this argument cannot be denied. Traditional concepts of
negligence cannot be blindly applied to actions between parent and child. A
parent must have authority to discipline his child, and acts committed by the
parent that would be tortious if directed toward someone else, cannot be so
considered when directed toward his child.6s The problem, therefore, is finding a way to totally abrogate parental immunity while allowing for the exercise of proper parental control and discipline. This undeniable "threat
to parental authority" argument could be overcome by a positive approach.
States such as Florida have diminished the scope of parental immunity to
a partial immunity,66 believing that such an approach would protect both the
child's rights and the parent's authority to exercise discipline and control over
the child.67 This is not the case. By retaining parental immunity "where the
alleged negligent act involves an exercise of parental authority over the
child,"(68 the parent is protected, but not the child. Partial immunity inevitably
leads to the drawing of arbitrary distinctions as to when particular parental
conduct falls within the immunity. 9 Even more detrimental to the child's
rights is the fact that when the parent is within the safety of the rule he can
70
act negligently with impunity
While the partial immunity approach does not provide justice for both
parent and child, an approach adopted by California does. California has
totally abandoned the parental immunity doctrine and at the same time has
protected the parent's authority to exercise discipline and control over his
child. 71 The California approach allows the parent to exercise authority over
his child only to the extent that such exercise of authority is reasonable. The
reasonableness is, of course, viewed in the light of the parental role. Using this
California approach, Florida could overcome the "threat to parental authority
and discipline" argument supporting parental immunity and could abrogate
the parental immunity adopted in 1958.
CONCLUSION

Although tort immunity between parent and child may have had a logical
basis in the era of its creation, the doctrine has no place in Florida law today.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 921, 479 P.2d 648, 652, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 292 (1971).
See text accompanying note 27 supra.
See, e.g., Coller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
Id. at 13, 122 N.W.2d at 198.
Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 922, 479 P.2d 648, 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 293 (1971).

70.
71.

Id.
Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol25/iss4/7

8

